Bunkum like this is what comes of too much David Ray Griffin. On 9/11, the normal contingent of 14 fighters was on alert to protect the U.S. Four of those were responsible for the northeast: two at the Otis ANG base on Cape Cod and two at Langley AFB in southern Virginia. Had it been 1980, many more fighters would have been available. When the cold war ended, budget cuts greatly reduced the number of fighters on alert. Before 9/11 NORAD was responsible for identifying intruders coming from outside U.S and Canadian borders, not from within. This is quite obvious when we look at the locations of the 7 alert bases in 2001.
Oregon ANG, Portland, Oregon
March ARB, Riverside, California
Ellington ANG, Houston, Texas
Tyndall AFB, Panama City, Florida
Homestead ARB, Homestead, Florida
Langley AFB, Hampton, Virginia
Otis ANG, Falmouth, Massachusetts
All seven alert bases were on the coast. Air Force planes were often available for internal intercepts but did not take a proactive role: because the FAA monitored this traffic, the FAA would have to request NORAD to find available fighter aircraft if needed.
The idea that in 2001 67 planes were intercepted within 10-15 minutes after straying off course is ludicrous. It normally could take that long for a scramble order to be received. Then a pilot would have to finish gearing up, get to the plane, power up, take off, reach altitude and speed, and get to the target. From the time the scramble order was given, the goal was 10 minutes to takeoff, but I don't know if that was often achieved. From the 9/11 Commission report:
Before 9/11, it was not unheard of for a commercial aircraft to deviate slightly from its course, or for an FAA controller to lose radio contact with a pilot for a short period of time. A controller could also briefly lose a commercial aircraft's transponder signal, although this happened much less frequently. However, the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal would be a rare and alarming occurrence, and would normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an aircraft crash. In all of these instances, the job of the controller was to reach out to the aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other planes in the vicinity in an attempt to reestablish communications and set the aircraft back on course. Alarm bells would not start ringing until these efforts-which could take five minutes or more-were tried and had failed.
And today, in 2006? "NORAD is now linked up telephonically 24 hours a day, seven days a week, so anything that's an anomaly or a suspected anomaly that's found in the system, NORAD knows about it as quickly as we do," said David Canoles, FAA's manager of air traffic evaluations and investigations. (ABC News, August 13, 2002)
Would the hijacked planes have been easy to find? No. The hijackers turned off the planes' identifying transponders, so that Air Traffic Control would have to sort them out from a few thousand radar blips on screen in the northeast. And NORAD's radar system mostly looked outward from the coast, not inward.
Contrary to conspiracy theorist claims that air defenses had "stood down" on 9/11, they were unusually "geared up." Because of the semiannual exercises that had been going on for several days, NORAD radar stations and battle rooms were fully staffed, with top commanders there to make decisions. A good overview of the activity at NEADS, NORAD's northeastern U.S. command post, is here: http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/planes/defense/aviationnow_jumpstart.htm
On 9/11 the U.S. air defense system was not "engaged in as many as 15 war games simulating hijacks and attacks." There is specifically no record of hijacking drills being performed. The only military radar "clutter" was on NORAD screens in Colorado, and was eliminated as soon as the real-world alert was issued. http://911myths.com/html/on_the_record___.html
The idea that Dick Cheney is "suspect" because he knew of normal war game activity is extremely odd. Thousands of people knew of the same war games. Hundreds planned them. Are they all suspect?
Next, the truthsters accept Senator Dayton's statement that the Air Force "sent F-15s in the wrong direction," and jump to the additional conclusion that a conspiracy was involved in the alleged diversion. Here is NORAD's timeline of events:
American Airlines Flight 11 Boston enroute to Los Angeles
FAA Notification to NEADS 0840
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis Air National Guard Base, Falmouth, Mass. Two F-15s) 0846
Fighters Airborne 0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 1) 0846 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location Aircraft not airborne/153 miles
United Airlines Flight 175 Boston enroute to Los Angeles
FAA Notification to NEADS 0843*
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis ANGB, Falmouth, Mass.
Same 2 F-15s as Flight 11) 0846
Fighters Airborne 0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 2) 0902 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 8 min/71 miles
*NORAD's time of 8:43 is incorrect. We know that the two F-15 pilots out of Otis were in a holding pattern in military airspace off Long Island, about 70 miles from Manhattan, when they learned that flight 175 had also hit the WTC. NORAD had not been notified by United Airlines or the FAA of flight 175's status as a probable hijack.
American Flight 77 Dulles, Washington, D.C., enroute to Los Angeles
FAA Notification to NEADS 0924
Fighter Scramble Order (Langley AFB, Hampton, Va. 2 F-16s) 0924
Fighters Airborne 0930
Airline Impact Time (Pentagon) 0937(estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 12 min/105 miles
United Flight 93 Newark to San Francisco
FAA Notification to NEADS N/A
Fighter Scramble Order (Langley F-16s already airborne for AA Flt 77)
Fighters Airborne (Langley F-16 CAP remains in place to protect DC)
Airline Impact Time (Pennsylvania) 1003 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 11 min/100 miles
(from DC F-16 CAP)
As for the FAA's culpability, the 9/11 Commission report does say the FAA did not follow proper procedure for notifying the military:
Military Notification and Response
Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military – at any level – that American 11 had been hijacked.
And:
In summary, NEADS received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it struck the North Tower. That nine minutes' notice before impact was the most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings. (This conflicts with at least one report that says NORAD was informed that flight 77 was a hijack at 9:25. That flight hit the Pentagon at approx. 9:38. See "The Complete 9/11 Timeline.")
Langley Fighters Placed on Battle Stations:
Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. NEADS considered scrambling alert fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia to New York, to provide backup. The Langley fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09. NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked.
Confusion Over flight 77 and flight 11, Fighters Head in Wrong Direction.
Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he's heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.
After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the order at 9:23: "Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area.. . . [I]f they're there then we'll run on them.. . .These guys are smart." That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24. Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported southbound American 11 and the nation's capital.
At the suggestion of the Boston Center's military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS: "We're looking-we also lost American 77."The time was 9:34.151This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.
At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington: "Latest report. Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away." This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters: "Okay, we're going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House." He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean. "I don't care how many windows you break," he said. "Damn it.. . . Okay. Push them back."
The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target or the target's location. Second, a "generic" flight plan-prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly-incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go "090 for 60" superseded the original scramble order.
After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D.C. Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but "it kind of faded" over Washington. The time was 9:38.The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46.The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away.
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second:
Confusion? Absolutely. Major problems that needed fixing? You bet. Should we be pushing to find out if those problems have been fixed? Certainly. Evidence of conspiracy? None.